Network controllability robustness reflects how well a networked system can maintain its controllability against destructive attacks. Its measure is quantified by a sequence of values that record the remaining controllability of the network after a sequence of node-removal or edge-removal attacks. Traditionally, the controllability robustness is studied only for directed networks and is determined by attack simulations, which is computationally time consuming or even infeasible. In the present paper, an improved method for predicting the controllability robustness of undirected networks is developed based on machine learning using a group of convolutional neural networks (CNNs). In this scheme, a number of training data generated by simulations are used to train the group of CNNs for classification and prediction, respectively. Extensive experimental studies are carried out, which demonstrate that 1) the proposed method predicts more precisely than the classical single-CNN predictor; 2) the proposed CNN-based predictor provides a better predictive measure than the traditional spectral measures and network heterogeneity.
general, mostly directed network. It was found that clustering and modularity have no prominent impact on the network controllability, but degree correlation has a certain effect [7] . It was revealed [8] that random networks of any topology are controllable by an extremely small number of driver nodes if both of its minimum in-and out-degrees are bigger than two. A control centrality was introduced in [16] to measure the importance of nodes regarding their roles against random attacks. The network controllability of some canonical graph models is studied and compared in [17] . For growing networks, the evolution of network controllability is investigated in [18] . Moreover, the controllability of multi-input/multi-output networked systems is studied in [10] , [19] , with necessary and sufficient conditions derived. Recently, it was realized that some special motifs such as loops and chains are beneficial for enhancing the robustness of network controllability against attacks [20] [21] [22] . A comprehensive survey of the subject is presented in [15] .
Regarding the robustness of network controllability against attacks, which includes random failures and malicious destructions, a large number of studies have been reported [16] , [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] . For node-removal or edge-removal attacks, the main issue is to develop a measure that reflects how well the networks can maintain their controllability after the attacks took place. One measure for the network controllability is quantified by the number of external control inputs needed to recover or retain the network controllability after the occurrence of an attack, while its robustness is quantified by a sequence of values that record the remaining levels of the network controllability after a sequence of attacks [21] . To optimize the network robustness, one usually aims to enhance and maintain a highest possible connectedness of the network against attacks [25] . Given a degree-preserving requirement or constraint (i.e., the degree of each node remains unchanged through the process arXiv:2003.08563v1 [physics.soc-ph] 19 Mar 2020 of optimization), an edge-rewiring method is proposed in [28] , which increases the number of edges between highdegree nodes, so as to generate a new network with a largest k-shell component. In [29] , the structure of a network is modified by degree-preserving edge-rewiring, where a spectral measure is used for optimization. By optimizing a specified spectral measure of the network through random edge-rewiring, the robustness of the resultant network is enhanced consequently. However, it was noted that the correlation between spectral measures and the robustness is indeed unclear [30] . Nevertheless, given a reliable predictive measure or indicator of the network robustness, optimization algorithms can be applied [31] [32] [33] [34] . In the case that there are more than one predictive measure, multiobjective optimization schemes can be adopted [35] . In [36] , it is shown that network robustness against edge-and node-removals can be enhanced simultaneously. A common observation is that heterogeneous networks with onionlike structures are robust against attacks [25] , [37] [38] [39] . The evolution of alternative attack and defense is studied in [40] , where attack refers to edge-removal and defense means edge-replenishment. The connectedness of the largest-sized cluster is a commonly-used measure for such robustness [25] . It is noted that, although the robustness of network connectedness has a certain positive correlation with the robustness of the network controllability, they have very different characteristics and measures.
Although the correlation between network topology and network controllability has been investigated, no specific theoretical indicator or performance index was found that can precisely quantify the general network controllability robustness. Under different types of attacks, the robustness of network controllability behaves differently. The nature of the attack methods leads to different measures of the importance of a node (or an edge) in a network. In the literature, degree and betweenness are two commonly-used measures for the importance of nodes and edges, respectively [41] .
It was observed that a power-law degree distribution does not necessarily imply a fragile controllability robustness against targeted node-removals; what really contributes to enhance the network controllability robustness is the multiple-chain structure [42] and multi-loop structure [20] , [21] . Later, it was observed [22] that it is particularly beneficial to the network controllability robustness if the multiple-loops are across the entire networks rather than only within local communities. Lately it was empirically observed [43] that to achieve optimal controllability robustness against random node attacks, both in-and out-degrees of a directed network should be extremely homogeneous.
On the other hand, in the field of machine learning, deep neural networks have shown powerful capability in performing classification and regression tasks in image processing. Convolutional neural network (CNN) is one kind of effective deep neural network [44] . CNN is able to automatically analyze inner features of a dataset without human interference. But, if the user has some prior knowledge and it can be ensured that such prior knowledge would not mislead machine learning, then CNN will become even much powerful for data analysis and processing. Successful real-world applications of CNNs include text recognition and classification [45] [46] [47] , face recognition and detection [48] , collective classification [49] , air quality forecasting [50] , etc.
Traditionally, for large-scale complex networks, their controllability robustness is evaluated and predicted by attack simulations, which however are extremely computationally time consuming. To improve the efficiency of prediction for the network controllability robustness, this paper takes a machine learning-based approach to designing a knowledge-based predictor for the controllability robustness (iPCR), which is an improved version of the single CNN-based predictor of the controllability robustness (PCR) developed in [51] , taking advantage of available prior knowledge.
One unique feature of this iPCR is that it can be applied to both directed and undirected networks, since there is no essential difference for the CNN to process an image converted from a directed or an undirected network, where the symmetry in the network-converted image does not affect the learning of the CNN. As such, the proposed iPCR has a much wider application range than other traditional methods.
Another improved mechanism in iPCR is that the network-converted images are updated independently of the generation process. This is illustrated by Fig. 1 , where in the upper row there are intrinsic features of the images pertaining to the generation of the network. These biased features are filtered out by shuffling the rows and columns of the image, as shown in the lower row of the figure. For example, in a Barabási-Albert (BA) scale-free network, the preferential attachment mechanism gives the 'old' nodes higher degrees, which are usually allocated near each other therefore have small numbers in the adjacency matrix. As a result, there are always some sparks in the BA-converted image, as shown in Fig. 1 (a) . The generation-based features necessarily mitigate the task of a CNN in classification and regression. Therefore, in the iPCR, these special features are filtered out by shuffling the rows and columns of the images, as shown in the lower row of Fig. 1 .
To briefly summarize, the proposed design of the iPCR is based on the following observations: 1) there is no clear correlation between the topological features and the controllability robustness of a general network, directed or undirected, 2) the adjacency matrix of a network can be equivalently represented as a gray-scale image, 3) the CNN technique has proved successful in image processing without human intervention, and 4) prior knowledge at hand could be sufficiently utilized as preprocessing and filtering tools. In the iPCR, a number of training data generated by simulations are used to train the group of CNNs for classification and prediction, respectively.
Extensive experimental studies are carried out, which demonstrate that 1) the proposed method predicts more precisely than the single-CNN predictor; 2) the CNN-based prediction method provides a better predictive measure than the traditional spectral measures and network heterogeneity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the network controllability and its robustness against various destructive attacks. Section 3 introduces the proposed iPCR. In Section 4, experimental study is performed with analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes the investigation.
NETWORK CONTROLLABILITY AND ITS ROBUST-NESS
Consider a linear time-invariant networked system described byẋ = Ax+Bu, where A and B are constant matrices of compatible dimensions, x is the state vector, and u is the control input. The system is state controllable if and only if the controllability matrix [B AB A 2 B · · · A N −1 B] has a full row-rank, where N is the dimension of A, also the size of the networked system. If a system is state controllable, then its state vector x can be driven from any initial state to any desired state in the state space by a suitable control input u within finite time. The concept of structural controllability is a slight generalization dealing with two parameterized matrices A and B, in which the parameters characterize the structure of the underlying networked system: if there are specific parameter values that can ensure the parametric system be state controllable, then the system is structurally controllable.
The controllability of a network, or networked system, is measured by the density of the controlled nodes, n D , defined by
where N D is the number of external control inputs (driver nodes) needed to retain the network controllability, and N is the network size. This measure n D allows networks with different sizes can be compared. The network size does not change at a step with an edge-removal attack but would be reduced by a node-removal attack. In comparison, the smaller the n D value is, the better the network controllability will be. For a directed network, the number N D can be calculated according to the minimum inputs theorem derived based on maximum matching [5] . A maximum matching is a matching that contains the largest possible number of edges, which cannot be further extended in the network. A node is matched if it is the end of an edge in the matching; otherwise, it is unmatched. When a maximum matching is found, the number N D of driver nodes is determined by the number of unmatched nodes, i.e. N D = max{1, N − |E * |}, where |E * | is the number of edges in the maximum matching E * .
As for an undirected network, its controllability can be calculated according to the exact controllability theorem derived based on the controllability matrix [6] . Given an undirected sparse network, its number N D of driver nodes is calculated by
Here, a network is considered to be sparse if the number of edges M , i.e., the number of nonzero elements in the adjacency matrix, is much smaller than the possible maximum number of edges, M max = N · (N − 1). Practically, if M/M max ≤ 0.05, then it can be considered as a sparse network. The measure of controllability robustness is calculated by
where N D (i) is the number of driver nodes needed to retain the network controllability after a total of i nodes have been removed, and N is the original network size. When these values are plotted, a curve is obtained, called the controllability curve.
To compare the controllability robustness of two networks against the same attack sequence, their controllability curves are plotted against each other for better visualization. Numerically, a controllability curve c is given by an (N − 1)
vector n c D = [n c D (1), n c D (2), · · · , n c D (N − 1)]. Thus, given two network controllability curves, c 1 and c 2 , the difference (error) of the two curves, when the same number of i nodes are removed, is calculated by
The average errorσ is then calculated bȳ
The vector σ(i) is used to measure the error between the predicted controllability curve against the true curve; while the scalarσ measures the overall error of prediction. The overall robustness of network controllability R c is defined as [27] , [52] 
where, as an extension of the robustness measure defined in [25] , n D (i) represents the controllability of the network when a total of i nodes have been removed from the network. Given two complex networks under the same attack, the one with a lower R c value is considered having better controllability robustness. In the following, for convenience in description, sometimes the integer index sequence i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 will be replaced by the fractional index sequence p = , where a single CNN is used for controllability robustness (CR) prediction. The input is an image converted from the adjacency matrix; the output is the corresponding CR curve.
PREDICTOR FOR NETWORK CONTROLLABILITY ROBUSTNESS
The framework of PCR is shown in Fig. 2 , where a single CNN is trained for prediction, referred to as a predictor. This framework straightforwardly performs fairly good predictions, with an overall error less than the standard deviation of the testing samples [51] . However, there are two main issues about this framework. First, many of the PCR predicted controllability curves are vibrating (especially in the initial stage of the attacks), while the real controllability curves are generally smooth. Second, PCR ignores all available prior knowledge, and trains the single CNN using the raw data without any preprocessing.
To address the first issue, in the new framework a data processer called filter is installed after the prediction and before the output. Using available prior knowledge about the dynamics, upper and lower boundaries of the controllability curve can be pre-set. Specifically, during a node-removal attack process, where i (i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1) nodes are removed, the upper and lower bounds of the controllability curve at position i are pre-set as follows:
and
where ub(i) and lb(i) represent the upper and lower bounds of n D (i), respectively; N 0 D means the minimum required number of driver nodes for the original network before being attacked, which can be calculated by Eq. (2).
The following boundary processor is designed:
Based on this, a median filter with a mask length L is implemented.
To address the second issue, although humanintervention-free is one of the most attractive properties of deep learning, some available knowledge and common sense may be used if such human knowledge would not mislead the machine learning process. Such prior knowledge of the network data will be preprocessed before prediction. For instance, if the network topology is known beforehand, then the prediction work can be passed to a CNN that is specialized for such a topology, which can have better prediction performance.
The framework of iPCR consists of a group of CNNs, including a classifier (used for data classification) and several predictors, as shown in Fig. 3 . Compared to PCR, iPCR first checks the classifiability of the input data. The classifier CNN c is trained by applying the prior knowledge of the user. If an input is classifiable and belongs to a specific data cluster, then it will be passed to the specific CNN i (i = 1, 2, . . . , nc, where nc is the number of clusters) for prediction; otherwise, the input is passed to a general CNN all , which is trained in exactly the same way as the CNN in PCR. Each CNN i (i = 1, 2, . . . , nc) is then trained by the specific cluster of data, such that it is specialized in predicting a cluster, although probably not suitable for another.
In the experimental study, two types of prior knowledge are tested, namely the network topology (presented in Sec. 4) and the node degree (presented in Supplementary Information (SI) due to space limitation in the paper). Experimental results show that the former provides helpful prior knowledge, while the later is misleading and consequently the prediction results are degenerated.
Finally, before outputting the predicted results, iPCR operates a filter that includes a boundary processor (as shown in Eq. (9)) and a median filter. If the input data can be clearly classified as one specific group, then iPCR uses a specifically trained CNN i , i = 1, 2, . . . , nc, where nc is the number of clusters; otherwise, if the input data is non-classifiable based on the current knowledge, then iPCR degenerates to PCR using a single CNN all .
Convolutional Neural Network
The CNN framework, which includes a classifier, several predictors and a filter, is now introduced along with its configuration and parameter settings. Figure 4 shows the detailed CNN structure. The detailed parameter settings of the 7 groups of convolutional layers are given in Table 1 . Here, the CNN architecture follows the Visual Geometry Group (VGG) 1 ) architecture [53] . The number of feature map (FM) groups is set to 7, since the input size is 1000 × 1000 in the following experiments. Note that this number should be set to be greater for a larger input dataset. Each FM consists of a convolution layer, a ReLU, and a max pooling layer. A ReLU provides a commonlyused activation function f (x) = max(0, x) [54] . The output of each hidden layer, i.e., a multiplication of weights, is summed up and then rectified by the ReLU for the next layer. The max pooling layer reduces the dimension of the dataset for the input to the next layer.
For prediction, following the FM groups, the fullyconnected layer outputs an (N − 1) vector that represents the predicted controllability curve; while for classification, an extra softmax layer [55] is attached at the end such that the output is a vector of nc real numbers. Moreover, pl i ( nc i=1 pl i = 1) represents the probability that the input image belongs to cluster i, i = 1, 2, . . . , nc. A threshold 1. http://www.robots.ox.ac.uk/ ∼ vgg/ η = 0.8 is set such that, only if there exists a pl i ≥ η (i = 1, 2, . . . , nc), it returns a result indicating that the input image is classifiable (belonging to cluster i); otherwise, the input is recognized as non-classifiable.
Note that for different purposes, the internal weights of the CNN will be set differently. Here, for illustration, the structures of predictors and classifiers are plotted together. But a predictor and a classifier do not share any internal weight, and each CNN works (including training and testing) independently in the proposed iPCR.
The loss function used in the classifier is the cross entropy. Given the predicted and the true probability distribution of an instance, denoted by pl and tl respectively, the cross entropy of this instance is calculated as follows:
The loss function used in the predictor is equal to the mean-squared error between the predicted controllability curve pv and the true curve tc, which is calculated as follows:
where || · || is the Euclidean norm. The training process for the classifier and predictor aims to minimize the cross entropy in Eq. (10) and the meansquared error in Eq. (11), respectively.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES

Experimental Settings
Four typical undirected synthetic networks are adopted for simulation, namely the Barabási-Albert (BA) scale-free network [56] , Erdös-Rényi (ER) random-graph network [57] , q-snapback network (QSN) [20] , [22] , and Newman-Watts (NW) small-world network [58] .
In the following subsections, the generation methods and parameter settings of the above four networks are introduced, respectively.
Note that, given the network size N and average degree k , there are M = N · k edges in total. Standard notation · and · represent the floor and ceiling functions, respectively. The concatenation layer rearranges the matrix into a vector, from FM 7 to FC 1, i.e.,
output:
is a hyperparameter. Set L2 = 4096 in this paper. For prediction, another fully-connected layer FC p is used as the output layer, yielding an (N − 1) vector in the output. For classification, a fully-connected layer FC c followed by a softmax layer is used. The output is the labeled according to the input data.
Barabási-Albert (BA) Scale-Free Network
A BA network is generated as follows:
• Start with n 0 fully-connected nodes (i.e., an n 0clique).
• For nodes i (i = n 0 +1, . . . , N ), each of them connects to each of nodes j (j = 1, . . . i − 1) with a probability of p BA = kj l k l , where k j denotes the degree of node j. At each step, there are e BA edges being added preferentially.
Set n 0 = k +1 and e BA = M −( n 0 2 ) N −n0 . To exactly control the number of the generated edges to be M , proportionally adding or removing edges can be performed.
Erdös-Rényi (ER) Random-Graph Network
An ER network is generated as follows:
• Start with N isolated nodes.
• Pick up all possible pairs of nodes from the N given nodes, denoted as i and j (i = j, i, j = 1, 2, ..., N ), once and once only. Connect each pair of nodes with a probability p ER ∈ [0, 1].
To exactly control the number of the generated edges to be M , uniformly-randomly adding or removing edges can be performed.
q-Snapback Network
The q-snapback network (QSN) was originally constructed as a directed network [20] but is converted to be an undirected one here, with only one layer r QSN for simplicity. It is generated as follows:
• Start with a chain of N nodes, where each node i (i = 2, ..., N − 1) has two edges connecting to its neighboring nodes i − 1 and i + 1.
• For each node i = r QSN + 1, r QSN + 2, . . . , N , it connects backward to the previously-appeared nodes
The probability parameter q can be calculated from the given N , M , and r QSN . For
Newman-Watts (NW) Small-World Networks
An NW network is generated as follows:
• Start with an N -node loop having K connected nearest-neighbors on each side.
• Some edges are added without removing any existing edges, until totally M edges have been added.
Set K = 2 in the following; that is, a node i is connected to its two nearest neighbors on each side, i.e., with nodes i − 1, i + 1, i − 2 and i + 2.
Since the above generation methods will generate networks with some strong visible features (as illustrated by Fig. 1) , the rows and columns of the resulting adjacency matrices are shuffled, so as to filter out these features. It should be noted, however, that after shuffling the neighboring relationship will be changed. For example, in QSN, the starting chain remains, which connects all the N nodes, but now it is not necessary that node i (the ith row and column in the adjacency matrix) remains to connect nodes i − 1 and i + 1 like before.
Next, in Sec. 4.2, the performances of PCR and iPCR are compared on predicting the controllability robustness of unweighted networks against random node-removal attacks. Then, in Sec. 4.3, PCR and iPCR are compared on predicting the controllability robustness of weighted networks against targeted node-removal attacks. In these two experimental studies, PCR and iPCR aim to predict the precise controllability curves. Finally, in Sec. 4.4, PCR and iPCR are compared on predicting the ordinal ranks of the network controllability robustness, and compared to 6 spectral measures and the heterogeneity.
In all the following comparisons, a filter consisting of a boundary processor and a median filter (with L = 9) are installed in both PCR and iPCR.
Unweighted Networks under Random Attacks
The controllability robustness prediction on unweighted networks with size N = 1000 and average degree k = 3, 4, 5, under random node-removal attacks, is studied.
There are 12 network configurations in total. For each configuration, 500 training samples are used. Each sample includes an adjacency matrix (as the input) and its controllability robustness curve obtained from simulation (as the output). CNN all of iPCR is trained by 12 × 500 = 6000 training samples; while each of CNN 1,2,3,4 is trained by 3 × 500 = 1500 samples. Each CNN k (k = 1, 2, 3, 4) is specifically trained for one of the four network types, namely BA, ER, QSN, and NW; while CNN all is trained by the ensemble of all the networks. PCR is trained in the same way as CNN all of iPCR. Given a random attack, in simulation the result is averaged from 10 independent runs, so as to balance mitigating and randomness influences, which also reduces the burden of computation.
Another set of 100 testing samples for each network configuration are generated independently. The classification results of CNN c are shown in Table 2 . As illustrated by Fig.  1 , shuffling filters out the method-generated features in the resultant images, which however makes the classification task becoming tougher. It can be seen from the figure that CNN c correctly classifies the four types of networks at a successful rate higher than 0.8333, resulting images indistinguishable by eyes. Since the threshold is set to η = 0.8 in the softmax layer of the classifier, an input is non-classifiable if it generates a result with the probability of success greater than 0.8, and in this case the input is considered being correctly predicted by the CNN all . As can be seen from Table  2 , the rate of non-classifiable (NC) data is low, indicating the effectiveness of the classifier which uses prior knowledge.
Note that if an input is incorrectly classified, it will be passed to a wrong predictor that is specialized for a different network type. This will totally mislead the prediction, and therefore is harmful particularly if the error rate is high. In iPCR, according to Table 2 , BA and QSN may be misclassified as ER at rates 0.0922 and 0.0165, respectively; NW may be mis-classified QSN at a rate 0.0042; ER will not be mis-classified to other networks, but becomes nonclassifiable at rate 0.0254. Overall, the classification error rates are quite low, so iPCR is proved working well.
A performance comparison between PCR and iPCR is shown in Fig. 5 . In each subplot, in a unique network configuration, the green curve shows the true value (tVal) generated by simulation; the red dashed curve shows the predicted values by PCR; the black dotted curve represents the predicted results of iPCR. The shadow in the same color represents the range of standard deviation. As can be seen from the plots, the black curves are obviously closer to the green curves, better than the red curves, meaning that iPCR predicts the controllability more accurately than PCR, in all 12 cases. The results confirm that prior knowledge of the network topology is indeed helpful if correctly used. It is notable that the predicted curves are not as oscillatory as those obtained in [51] , thanks to the filters used in both PCR and iPCR. The average error calculated according to Eq. (4) is plotted in Fig. 6 , where the black curve shows that iPCR has a lower average error (σ) than the red dashed curve of PCR, through the entire attacking process. The inset shows a clearer plot of the comparison for P N ∈ [0.9, 1]. The average error is taken from all 12 configurations, namely, a total of 1200 testing samples. It is noticeable that both PCR and iPCR gain average errors with standard deviations much lower than that of the testing set (i.e., the 1200 testing samples), throughout the entire attack process.
Weighted Networks under Targeted Attacks
The controllability robustness prediction on weighted networks with size N = 1000 and average degree k ∈ [3, 5] , under targeted node-removal attacks, is studied.
For each network instance, its average degree k is a real random number generated from the range of [3, 5] ; its edge weights are uniformly-randomly assigned from the range of (0, 1). Again, PCR contains a single CNN, while iPCR uses a CNN all with four specialized CNN 1,2,3,4 for the four types of networks respectively, if classifiable. The targeted attack performs node-removals according to the degrees of nodes, from high to low sequentially. The confusion matrix shown in Table 3 suggests that the precision of the CNN c classifier is high. Slightly dif- Table 2 , here the CNN c can either correctly classify the weighted BA and QSN respectively, or return a result of non-classifiable, without any mis-classification. The weighted ER and NW have very low probabilities to be classified as weighted QSN. Shuffling is also performed on these weighted networks. The overall precision on classifying weighted networks is slightly higher than that on unweighted networks.
In the experiments reported in Sec. 4.2, the average degree k is set to integers 3, 4, 5, respectively. Each column in Fig. 5 shows the same type of networks, with increasing k from 3 to 5. Although PCR and iPCR are trained without any information about the average degrees, as can be seen from Fig. 5 , both PCR and iPCR return different predictions, when the input is of the same network type with different average degrees. However, this does not imply that average degree is a good feature or useful prior knowledge. In contrast, the average degree is known to be not suitable for preprocessing when used as prior knowledge. An example is given in the Supplementary Information (SI), where three network clusters are defined, namely ' k = 3', ' k = 4', and ' k = 5'. The prediction results is distorted due to the low precision of classification. This demonstrates that the prior knowledge used should be correct and appropriate, as common sense, otherwise misleading could happen. Figure 7 shows the prediction results of PCR and iPCR on weighted networks under targeted attacks. Again, it is clear that, in each subplot, the black dotted curve is closer to the green curve than the red dashed curve. The higher precision of iPCR in prediction is partially due to the high classification rate presented in Table 3 . Another reason is that an specialized CNN predictor is always better than a mixed one, as is intuitively so. Figure 8 shows that the average prediction error of iPCR (black curve) is lower than that of PCR (red dashed curve), throughout the entire attack process. Note that both PCR and iPCR gain average errors with standard deviations much lower than that of the testing samples through a long period. Differing from random attacks, in a targeted attack, when the portion of removed nodes is somewhat greater than 0.7, the network requires n D ≈ 1 to gain a full controllability. Although PCR and iPCR gain lower predictive errors during this stage (when P N is somewhat greater than 0.7), the standard deviation of the testing sample actually becomes nearly zero.
Comparison of Prediction Measures
Spectral measures have long been used to quantify the connectedness robustness of complex networks against nodeand edge-removal attacks. It has certain positive correlation to controllability, but they cannot be treated equally.
Here, six commonly-used spectral measures, namely spectral radius (SR), spectral gap (SG), natural connectiv-ity (NCo), algebraic connectivity (ACo), effective resistance (ERe), and spanning tree count (STC) are compared in measuring the controllability robustness. Definitions and computational formulas for these measures can be found in, e.g., [29] . Recently, it was also found that heterogeneity (HE) reflects the controllability robustness [22] . In this paper, PCR and iPCR are used to predict the entire controllability curves in Secs. 4.2 and 4.3. Noticed that a predicted curve (a vector) can also be converted to a measure (a scalar) through Eq. (6) . Thus, in the following, the above 9 prediction measures will be compared, namely, the 6 common spectral measures (SR, SG, NCo, ACo, ERe, STC), HE, PCR and iPCR.
The above prediction measures are used to predict the ordinal ranks of a total of 120 networks, for four network types with three different average degrees. These ranks are listed in a descending order in terms of controllability robustness, from the best to the worst. Specifically, each prediction measure returns a predicted rank list of the 120 networks. Then, the 9 rank lists returned by the 9 prediction measures are compared to the true rank list generated by simulation. The rank error information is summarized in Table 4 , where the rank error σ rank is calculated by
where rl pm represents the rank list predicted by a prediction measure, and rl t represents the true rank obtained from simulation. For example, given two predicted rank lists, rl pm1 = [3, 5, 2, 4, 1] and rl pm2 = [2, 1, 4, 5, 3], and a true rank list, rl t = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], the rank errors are obtained as σ rank1 = [2, 3, 1, 0, 4], σ rank1 = [1, 1, 1, 1, 2], respectively. The mean, maximum, and minimum of the rank error can be calculated accordingly. The number of '0' elements in a rank error list σ rank is counted and then included in the 'correct rank' column. Finally, the number of networks, which includes the predicted top 10% and the confirmed top 10% by simulation, is counted and then included in the predicted 'top 10%' column. The number in the 'bot 10%' column is similarly calculated, where 'bot' is short for bottom. The detailed rank values of the 9 prediction measures are given in SI. It can be seen from Table 4 that iPCR receives the minimum average rank error 103.73, followed by PCR. PCR obtains the minimum max rank error, followed by iPCR. Seven out of nine predictive measures receive a min rank error 0, meaning that these measures predict at least one rank exactly as the true rank. iPCR predicts 6 ranks correctly. ERe predicts 52 top 10% networks that are truly 10% networks, although their exact ranks may be different, which are followed by PCR and iPCR that correctly predict 46 and 45 networks respectively. Finally, PRC well predicts 104 bottom 10% networks, followed by ERe and iPCR. The test dataset contains 1200 networks, hence there are 120 networks ranked as top and bottom 10%, respectively.
It is thus clear that PCR and iPCR return better prediction measures than the spectral measures and the heterogeneity. More importantly, PCR and iPCR return not only the predictive measures, but also the entire controllability changing process of a network against the node-removal attack; while the spectral measures and heterogeneity return only a single quantitative value for the controllability robustness.
However, it is notable that PCR and iPCR require a substantial amount of training data, while the spectral measures and heterogeneity do not. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in [51] , the overhead in training a CNN is quite low which, compared to the exhaustive attack simulation, it is negligible.
CONCLUSIONS
Network controllability robustness, which reflects how well a networked system can maintain its controllability after destructive attacks, are usually measured via attack simulations. Such an exhaustive simulation approach can return the true value of the controllability robustness, but is computationally costly and very time consuming. The predictor of controllability robustness (PCR) employs a single convolutional neural network (CNN) to successfully achieve the prediction. In this paper, an improved multi-CNN and knowledge-based PCR (iPCR) is designed and evaluated, which takes advantage of prior knowledge from the given data. Extensive experimental studies, with thorough comparisons to eight other comparable measures, demonstrate that 1) the iPCR predicts more precisely than the PCR; 2) the iPCR provides a better predictive measure than the traditional spectral measures and network heterogeneity. Figure S1 show a comparison of PRC (predictor of controllability robustness) and iPCR k (improved PCR; the subscript 'k' means using average degree as prior knowledge for classification) on predicting the controllability robustness of unweighted networks under random attacks.
An Example of Inappropriately Using Prior Knowledge
PCR is trained and tested in the same way as it presented in the paper; while for iPCR k , the average degree information is used as prior knowledge for classification. There are 3 clusters of networks, with k = 3, k = 4, and k = 5, respectively.
As can be seen from Table S1 , the average degree is a bad labeling method for the classifier, which cannot correctly classify different networks with different average degrees. In this case, iPCR k has a higher probability to pass the input to a wrong predictor, thereby leading to a bad prediction. For example, a network with k = 3 may be recognized as one with k = 4, and then passed onto a classifier that was trained specifically using a substantial number of networks with k = 4, but has never encountered any sample network with k = 3 in training.
Due to the low precision in classification, the prediction results shown in Fig. S1 are expected to be unsatisfactory. A comparison of prediction errors is shown in Fig. S2 . It is unexpected to see that the average error of iPCR k is lower than PCR in the early stage, but becomes high in the late stage. However, when compared to the average error of iPCR, iPCR k shows very imprecise performance in prediction, which is unsatisfactory overall. In conclusion, the average degree is a bad measure to use as prior knowledge for preprocessing.
1 Figure S1 : Comparison of PRC and iPCR on unweighted networks under random attacks. P N represents the portion of nodes that have been removed from the network; n D is the required density of the controlled nodes. Green curves: the true value (tVal) from simulation; red curves: predicted by PCR; black curves: predicted by iPCR. The shadow in the same color represents the range of standard deviation. 
Detailed Ranks of Network Controllability
Tables S2-S31 show the detailed true ranks (tRank) and the ranks predicted by SR (spectral radius), SG (spectral gap), NCo (natural connectivity), ACo (algebraic connectivity), ERe (effective resistance), STC (spanning tree count), HE (heterogeneity), PCR, and iPCR, respectively. A bold italic number in the table indicates that the prediction measure predicts the true rank exactly. 
